The Ethical Brain

Book by Michael S. Gazzaniga, review by Robert Ettinger

Professor Gazzaniga, a cognitive scientist (Ph.D.) at Dartmouth, has been a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics since 2001, and his latest book reflects some of those concerns, beginning with abortion and stem cell research and extending into some old questions of moral philosophy. I’ll just touch briefly on some of his main ideas.

Abortion.

An embryo/fetus, he believes, cannot reasonably be considered a person until it has a brain capable of feelings and reactions. At 14 days, brain formation begins, and this for most scientists is the very earliest time one might choose for the beginning of ethical consideration. The first (not organized) electrical activity of the brain begins after week 5. By week 13 the fetus has begun to move, but is "not sentient." By week 23 the fetus can respond to aversive stimuli.

The author does not choose an exact dividing line, but definitely believes personhood does not begin at conception.

Stem cell research.

It is unreasonable to object to cloning for stem cells, he thinks, for many reasons. For example, invitro fertilization procedures routinely produce many embryos that are eventually discarded. For that matter, 60% to 80% of all natural fertilizations are naturally aborted. And of course, as previously noted, these embryos have no brains and cannot be regarded as people.

Life span extension.

Here he is wildly off track, apparently believing that escape from genetically programmed senescence is not possible, and perhaps not desirable—even though, in another chapter, he says it is possible and desirable to bypass genetic limitations on intelligence, and even though there have been successful genetic interventions, increasing lifespan, in lower animals. "Helping us stay as healthy as we can until the moment of death is the proper goal of aging research—nothing more and nothing less." He speaks of "normal" aging, like so many others—as though having a common disease makes it normal (healthy).

Free will.

Here also he is confused, saying (1) that free will is socially defined, and (2) that we have free will if we are not under abnormal constraints. Well, most philosophers are also confused, but Gazzaniga’s further problem is his fascination with the apparent experimental fact that—in many cases—we make decisions before becoming aware of them.

This is no great discovery. Anyone knows that we sometimes react "instinctively" without apparent conscious thought, sometimes to our later regret, sometimes not. The best philosophers recognize that we are machines—like every other part of nature—and that a leavening of randomness, even if that could exist, would not add freedom but reduce it, because we could be denied the results of our choices. We have freedom at the conscious level; that is all that is possible, and all that is necessary.

He spends considerable time on the juridical aspects of "free will"—whether people with faulty or damaged brains should be exculpated of their crimes. He acknowledges that this is a social or political question, not a philosophical one.

There are many interesting anecdotes from the laboratory, including the fact that certain mental abnormalities, such as a certain type of epilepsy, often result in hyperreligiosity.

 Brain enhancement.

As already noted, in contrast to his views on life extension, Gazzaniga accepts the possibility and desirability of intelligence improvement:

"The future is here. We have isolated one gene involved in intelligence, and others will follow. We know which parts of the brain are influenced by particular genes and which parts correlate with high IQ. We also know some of the neurochemicals involved in learning and memory.

With such knowledge, we will gain the understanding of what needs to be manipulated in increase intelligence in people who were not blessed with perfect genomes (or further increase the intelligence of those who already have ‘smart brains’)….My own belief is that none of this is threatening to our sense of self."